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Abstract. The quality of feature has significant impact on the perfor-
mance of detection techniques used for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack.
The features that fail to provide accurate characterization for network
traffic records make the techniques suffer from low accuracy in detec-
tion. Although researches have been conducted and attempted to over-
come this problem, there are some constraints in these works. In this
paper, we propose a technique based on Euclidean Distance Map (EDM)
for optimal feature extraction. The proposed technique runs analysis on
original feature space (first-order statistics) and extracts the multivari-
ate correlations between the first-order statistics. The extracted multi-
variate correlations, namely second-order statistics, preserve significant
discriminative information for accurate characterizations of network traf-
fic records, and these multivariate correlations can be the high-quality
potential features for DoS attack detection. The effectiveness of the pro-
posed technique is evaluated using KDD CUP 99 dataset and experi-
mental analysis shows encouraging results.
Keywords: Euclidean Distance Map, Multivariate Correlations,
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1 Introduction
The growing number of network intrusive activities poses a serious threat to
the reliability of network services. Businesses and individuals are suffering from
these malicious interceptions. Billions of dollars loss has been recorded over the
past few years [1].
As one of the major network intrusive activities, Denial-of-Service (DoS) at-
tack receives much attention due to its continuous growth and serious impact
on the Internet. A victim, such as host, router or entire network, can be over-
whelmed by a DoS attack using imposed computationally intensive tasks, using
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exploitation of system vulnerability or using floods with a huge amount of use-
less packets. The victim is then temporarily unavailable for the outside networks
from a few minutes to even several days. The availability of network services
is severely degraded by this type of network intrusive activities, thus effective
detection mechanisms for DoS attack are highly required.
However, the work that has been done so far is still far away from being per-
fect. Currently, the commercially used DoS attack detection systems are mainly
dominated by signature-based detection techniques [2][3]. In spite of having high
detection rates to the known attacks and low false positive rates, signature-based
techniques are easily evaded by new attacks and even variants of the existing
attacks.
Therefore, research community has started to explore a way to achieve novelty-
tolerant detection systems and developed the concept of anomaly-based detec-
tion [4][5]. The idea of anomaly-based detection is that network intrusions exhibit
significantly different behaviors than the normal network activities [6], and any
significant deviation from the normal network behaviors is identified as an intru-
sion. To implement this idea, various techniques, such as clustering [7][8], neural
network [9][10], pattern recognition [11][12], support vector machine [13], near-
est neighbor [14] and statistical detection techniques [15][16][17] have been used
to establish anomaly-based detection systems. However, some of the techniques
[7][10][14] suffer from relatively low accuracy in the task of attack detection,
though they show encouraging results in other tasks.
The aforementioned discussed problem is partly raised by the low quality
features which fail to provide sufficient discriminative power for correct traf-
fic discrimination. To address the problem, this paper presents the Euclidean
Distance Map (EDM) to analyze the original feature space (first-order statis-
tics) and extracts the multivariate correlations between the first-order statistics.
These multivariate correlations contain significant discriminative information
and play key roles in detection accuracy. The occurrence of network intrusions
cause changes to these multivariate correlations so that the changes can be used
as metrics for identifying intrusive activities. Moreover, various types of traffic
namely normal traffic and attack traffic can be easily and accurately charac-
terized by using the proposed EDM-based analysis technique. By looking into
the patterns, i.e. EDMs, the intrusive activities can be clearly identified and
differentiated from each other.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides current
work related to our research. Section 3 details the EMD-based multivariate cor-
relation analysis technique. Section 4 evaluates the performance of the proposed
approach in pattern extraction of DoS attack and makes some discussions. Fi-
nally, conclusions are drawn and future work is given in Section 5.
2 Related Work
Multivariate correlations are second-order statistics generated to reveal the re-
lations between or among the original features, i.e. first-order statistics. This
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correlative information provides important discriminative power and is proven
to be more effective for object clustering and classification.
Recently, researchers have investigated to explore extracting effective multi-
variate correlations for DoS attack detection, and different techniques have been
proposed. A team of researchers from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University
[17] proposed a covariance matrix based approach to mine the multivariate cor-
relations for sequential samples and reveal characteristics of different classes of
traffic records. This idea is later adopted by Travallaee et al. [18], who further
used the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the redundant infor-
mation contained in the original feature space from statistical point of view.
Such performance of the covariance matrix based approach can be refined by
using the appropriately selected features.
Apart from the above discussed statistical-based approaches, new solutions
proposed lately tend to consider the geometrical structure of the features. Jamdagni
et al. [11] developed a distance measure based correlation extraction approach, in
which the Mahalanobis Distance (MD) is used to measure the weighted distance
between each pair of features extracted from network traffic packet payload. In
addition, Tsai and Lin [19] estimated the sizes of triangle areas constructed by
any signal observed data object and any two centroids of distinct clusters. New
data formed by the areas of these triangles is used as a new feature space.
Although these approaches introduce some interesting concepts for multivari-
ate correlation extraction and show their abilities in extracting discriminative
power, they have some weaknesses and drawbacks. On one hand, techniques [17]
[18], such as the covariance matrix, will not work under the situation where an
attack linearly changes all monitored features and is vulnerable to mix-traffic
containing both normal and attack traffic. On the other hand, the distance mea-
sure based techniques either suffer from high computation complexity [11] or
are dependent on prior knowledge of both normal and attack traffic that causes
wrong characterization of any novelty [19].
Different from the above discussed techniques, our EDM-based analysis tech-
nique is independent on prior knowledge of the features of different classes and
withstands the issue of linearly changes all monitored features. It is robust to
mix-traffic and does not rely on the volume of network traffic. More importantly,
it is computationally efficient.
3 EDM Based Multivariate Correlation Analysis
The behavior of network traffic is reflected by its statistical properties. DoS at-
tempts to exhaust a victims resources, and its traffic behaves differently from the
normal network traffic. Therefore, the statistical properties can be used to reveal
the difference. To present the statistical properties, we propose a multivariate
correlation analysis approach which employs Euclidean distance for extracting
correlative information (named inner correlation) from the original feature space
of an observed data object. This approach shares similar proporties with the one
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developed in [21]. The detail of the proposed approach is given in the following
section.
3.1 Multivariate Correlation Extraction
Given an arbitrary dataset XT = [xT1 x
T
2 · · · xTn ], where xTi = [f i1 f i2 · · · f im] (1 ≤
i ≤ n) represents the ith m-dimensional traffic record. The dataset can be rep-
resented in detail as
X =

f11 f
1
2 · · · f1m
f21 f
2
2 · · · f2m
...
...
. . .
...
fn1 f
n
2 · · · fnm
 , (1)
where f il is the value of the l
th feature in the ith traffic record, l and i are varying
from 1 to m and from 1 to n respectively.
In order to further explore the inner correlations of the ith traffic record on a
multi-dimensional space, the record xTi is first transformed into a new m-by-m
feature matrix x
′
i by simply multiplying an m-by-m identity matrix I as shown
in Equation (2).
xTi I = x
′
i =

f i1 0 · · · 0
0 f i2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · f im

m×m
. (2)
The elements on the diagonal of the matrix x
′
i are the features of the record x
T
i .
Each column of the matrix x
′
i is a new m-dimensional feature vector denoted by
F ij
T
= [F
′ i
j,1 F
′ i
j,2 · · · F
′ i
j,m], (3)
where F
′ i
j,p = 0 if j 6= p and F
′ i
j,p = f
i
j if j = p . The parameters satisfy the
conditions of 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ p ≤ m. Thus, the m-by-m feature
matrix can be rewritten as
x
′
i = [F
i
1 F
i
2 · · · F im]. (4)
Once the transformation is finished, we can apply the Euclidean distance to
extract the correlation between the feature vectors j and k in the matrix x
′
i ,
which can be defined as
EDij,k =
√
(F ij − F ik)T (F ij − F ik). (5)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Therefore, the correlations between
features in the traffic record xTi defined by a Euclidean Distance Map (EDM)
are given below.
EDM i =

EDi1,1 ED
i
1,2 · · · EDi1,m
EDi2,1 ED
i
2,2 · · · EDi2,m
...
...
. . .
...
EDim,1 ED
i
m,2 · · · EDim,m
 . (6)
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For the dataset, its inner correlations can be represented by Equation (7).
EDMX = (EDM
1EDM2 · · · EDM i · · · EDMn) (7)
In comparison with [21], which considers only the lower triangle of the Eu-
clidean distance map, the multivariate correlation analysis approach proposed
in this paper takes the entire map into account. The EDM is then employed as
a means of network traffic characterization and a visualization tool to reveal the
patterns of various traffic.
3.2 Discussions
By making use of the multivariate correlations, various types of network traffic
can be clearly characterized. Additionally, the distance measure facilitates our
analysis to withstand the issue of linear change for all features.
The two primary advantages of the proposed EDM-based analysis technique
are supported by two underlying mathematical structures. They are the trans-
formed traffic record matrix and the Euclidean distance. These two mathemati-
cal tools help solve the dilemmas caused by the occurrence of two distinct pairs
of features having the same distance on one-dimensional space and the linear
change of all features.
Assume that there are three pairs of features A(1, 2), B(4, 8) and C(9, 10)
shown in Fig. 1. In this case, the ratio between the two features of A and that
between the two features of B have the same value which is equal to 1/2 = 4/8 =
0.5, and the one-dimensional linear distance between the two features of A and
the distance between the two features of C have the same value which is equal
to |1 − 2| = |9 − 10| = 1. For the conventional techniques, using ratio or one-
dimensional linear distance cannot differentiate the points which coincidentally
have the same value.
Fig. 1: Three pairs of features.
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Fig. 2: Distances between the features with three pairs.
However, the proposed EDM-based analysis technique can successfully with-
stand these difficulties. By applying the technique, the distances between the
features in the A, B and C are
√
(1− 0)2 + (0− 2)2 = √5,√(4− 0)2 + (0− 8)2
=
√
80 and
√
(9− 0)2 + (0− 10)2 = √181 respectively. Therefore, the proposed
technique can properly characterize network traffic records and is not affected
by the linear change of all features.
4 Experimental Results and Analysis
The performance of our proposed EMD-based analysis technique for character-
izing normal and DoS attack traffic records is evaluated using KDD CUP 99
dataset [1]. Although the dataset is not without criticism [20], it is the only pub-
lic dataset with labeled attack samples. Moreover, many research works have
been evaluated using this dataset as well.
4.1 Experimental Data
The 10 percent labeled dataset of the KDD CUP 99 dataset is involved in our
experimentation. Six different types of DoS attacks (including Teardrop, Smurf,
Pod, Neptune, Land and Back attacks) and normal network traffic from the la-
beled dataset are used for evaluation. The DoS attacks launch their malicious
activities by exploiting three widely used network protocols respectively. Nep-
tune, Land and Back attacks make use of TCP protocol. Teardrop sends its
attack payload over UDP. The payloads of Smurf and Pod attack are carried by
ICMP packets.
4.2 Results and Analysis
According to the working mechanisms discussed in Section 1, DoS attacks are
expected to present different behaviors to that of the normal traffic. Thus, the
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Fig. 3: EDM of normal TCP traffic record.
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EDMs of DoS attacks should be different from the EDM of normal traffic. If
significant differences can be found from these maps, the performance of the
proposed technique can be proven to be good in extracting discriminative power
from the first-order features of the different types of network traffic.
To demonstrate how EDM presents the correlations between the first-order
features, the EDMs of normal and attack traffic records generated using 32
numerical features are given in this subsection. As shown in Fig. 3, the EDM of
normal TCP traffic record is a symmetric matrix and the values of the elements
along its diagonal from top left hand side to bottom right hand side are all
equal to zeros. This is because the Euclidean distance measure is insensitive to
the orientation of a straight line formed by any two objects in the Cartesian
coordinate system, and the distance from a feature vector to itself is always
zero. In other words, the distance from object D to object E is equivalent to the
distance from object E to object D, and if object D and object E are the same
object, then their distance is zero.
Although we can directly compare the raw EDMs to confirm the differences,
it is a time-consuming task. In order to offer friendly visualization for the raw
EDMs, we convert them into color images. The images of normal TCP traffic
record and Neptune, Land and Back attack records are given in Fig. 4, and the
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Fig. 4: Images of the EDMs of normal TCP traffic record and Back, Land and
Neptune attack records.
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(a) Normal UDP traffic record
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Fig. 5: Images of EDMs of UDP traffic record and Teardrop attack record.
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(c) Smurf attack traffic record
Fig. 6: Images of EDMs of ICMP traffic record and Pod and Smurf attack records.
10 Zhiyuan Tan et al.
images of normal UDP traffic record and Teardrop attack record are shown in
Fig. 5. Finally, Fig. 6 presents the images of normal ICMP traffic record and
Smurf and Pod attack records.
As can be seen from Fig. 4(a), the image represents the visualized pattern
of the EDM of normal TCP traffic record. The color of an image point stands
for the value of an element on the EDM. The lighter and warmer the color is,
the greater value the element has. In other words, the darkest cold blue color
areas on the image are the lowest value areas on the EDM, and conversely the
lightest warm red color areas on the image are the highest value areas on the
EDM. Figs. 4(b), (c) and (d) visualize the EDMs of Back, Land and Neptune
attack records in the same manner respectively. The images of the attack EDMs
show clear differences from the EDM of the normal TCP traffic record.
Similarly, the images of the EDMs of UDP traffic record and Teardrop attack
record are exhibited in Fig. 5. The image of Teardrop shows apparent dissimilar-
ity to the image of normal UDP traffic. In addition, the images in Fig. 6 reveal
that the behaviors of ICMP-based attacks, namely Pod and Smurf attacks, are
away from the normal ICMP traffic as well.
The above experimental results demonstrate that our proposed EDM-based
technique achieves promising performance in characterizing various network traf-
fic records. Our experimental results also suggest that, by taking advantage of
the retained significant discriminative power, utilization of the generated multi-
variate correlations can improve the performance of DoS attack detection sys-
tem. Moreover, by looking into the images, we can easily identify the patterns of
the different traffic records. Therefore, the proposed EDM-based technique can
be further applied to creating the statistical signatures of network intrusions.
For detailed comparisons of effectiveness in intrusion detection wtih some other
existing approaches, please refer to [21].
5 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has proposed a multivariate correlation analysis approach based
on Euclidean distance to extract the multivariate correlations (second-order
statistics) of network traffic records. This proposed approach can better ex-
hibit the network traffic behaviors. We have evaluated the analysis approach on
the records of normal and DoS attack traffic from the KDD CUP 99 dataset.
The results illustrate that these second-order statistics can clearly reveal the
correlations between the first-order statistics and accurately characterize the
various types of traffic records. In future, we will further evaluate the proposed
technique on the task of DoS attack detection using Support Vector Data De-
scription (SVDD) technique, which is believed to be more promising in one-class
classification than SVM and NN techniques. We may also extend our research
to the characterization of temporal information.
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